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INTRODUCTION
By removing 468 children from an exclusive ranch community
on one April day (the Eldorado, Texas raid), Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services (the Department) social workers and
investigators attracted national headlines.1 Members of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
(FLDS) religious sect inhabited the Eldorado community located in
the rural western part of the state.2 The Department began its
investigation of the community after someone purporting to be a
sixteen-year-old female phoned the department to report physical
and sexual abuse occurring within the confines of the ranch.3 Prior
to removing the children, social workers and police investigators
interviewed members of the sect4 and determined that the children
faced “immediate danger to [their] physical health or safety.”5 Less
than four weeks later, a Texas Supreme Court ruling (the Texas
case) sent all of the FLDS children back to their homes and stated
that “[the] removal of the children was not warranted.”6 Many
people were outraged that children living in close quarters with
suspected sex offenders had to return to those conditions;7 others
expressed frustration and anger that the Department racked up a
hefty bill for the state without adequate evidence to support its
actions or to sustain state intervention.8
1. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613-14 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 613.
3. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 & n.12 (Tex. App. 2008)
(describing the problems with locating the alleged sixteen-year-old caller); see also In re Tex.,
255 S.W.3d at 613.
4. See In re Tex., 255 S.W.3d at 613.
5. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1.
6. In re Tex., 255 S.W.3d at 615.
7. See, e.g., Texas High Court: Removal of Sect Kids ‘Not Warranted’, CNN, May 29, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/05/29/texas.polygamists/index.html (quoting a Texas attor-
ney who said that “if the media showed the actual events of adult males demanding sex with
11-year-old girls, there would be no one questioning the graphic danger of returning these
children to their home at this time”).
8. Ashley Broughton, Polygamist Case Price Tag: $7 Million, CNN, June 3, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/03/flds.price/index.html?iref=newssearch (quoting a resident
of Eldorado who stated that Eldorado residents were “going to wind up with a $30 million bill
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In defense of Texas’s social workers, there is a good reason for
them not to have their “ducks in a row”9 before removing the
children: Texas law does not defer to their professional expertise but
requires them to formulate a belief as to what an ordinary prudent
person would find dangerous to a child.10 Moreover, the United
States Courts of Appeals are split over the federal standard for
when child removal is acceptable.11 Without a clear standard for
temporary removal even in traditional cases, social workers face a
double-edged sword: risking large expenditures and heavy criticism
in fruitless cases12 or taking no action and facing punishment,
termination by their employers, and brutal (potentially deadly)
abuse of children by not pursuing credible reports.13
A clearly stated standard recognizing the difficulty of investiga-
tion and high risk to children in complex cases would lead to greater
predictability, less confusion among nonattorney professionals,
and more effective collaboration among child protective services
workers, investigators, and attorneys. Studies show that in
effectively implemented child protection programs, “the ability of
committed and empowered professionals to ‘transcend professional
boundaries’ and work collaboratively” allows social workers and
here in this little county because these people didn’t have their ducks in a row”).
9. Id.
10. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN.§262.104(a) (Vernon 2008) (stating that child protective workers
or law enforcement officials may remove children without a warrant if the information they
receive and their personal knowledge would “lead a person of ordinary prudence and caution
to believe” a child is in danger of physical harm or sexual abuse).
11. See Alyson Oswald, They Took My Child! An Examination of the Circuit Split over
Emergency Removal of Children from Parental Custody, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1161, 1173-82
(2004) (describing the incompatibility of the Second Circuit’s decision in Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999), that social workers must always consider whether
sufficient time to obtain a warrant exists before removing children, and the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding in Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003), that balancing a variety of relevant
factors determines whether a situation warrants removal, and that lack of time itself is not
dispositive).
12. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 8 (describing the criticisms of the seven million dollars
Texas spent on removing hundreds of children from a polygamous sect in 2008).
13. See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional
Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 922 (2004) (citing Michael Fechter,
Helping Till it Hurts? DCF Errs By Taking Children in Marginal Cases, Lawyers Say, TAMPA
TRIB., May 29, 2002, at 1 (describing Kayla McKean’s murder)); see also Paul Chill, Burden
of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings,
42 FAM. CT. REV. 540, 542 (2004) (describing “defensive social work” as the propensity for
social workers to base their removal decisions on “fear of civil (and even criminal) liability”).
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state attorneys to form effective partnerships and achieve optimal
results.14 Complex cases feature greater numbers of children, more
potential predators, and difficult (or impossible) preintervention
investigations.15 When social workers have to weigh these factors
within a complex framework that does not value their professional
expertise, they become “frustrat[ed]” and start to “resent” the
process instead of working effectively through it.16 
This Note argues that the United States Supreme Court should
adopt a distinct constitutional standard for temporary, emergency
child removal in complex cases that comports with Due Process by
balancing parental liberty, the risk of error, and the government’s
parens patriae interest in the health and welfare of children.17 The
importance of a constitutional standard in complex cases stems
from three main factors: streamlining and ensuring consistent
results when parents of removed children file civil actions for
deprivations of their rights by state actors,18 creating a Due Process
standard that would apply to the states through the Fourteenth
14. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Working in the Best Interest of Children: Facilitating the
Collaboration of Lawyers and Social Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REC.
1, 19-20 & nn.69-73 (2006), available at http://lawrecord.typepad.com/rutgers_law_record/files/
Law_Record_Spring_Article_1_2006.pdf (citing clinical and academic studies for the
proposition that effective collaboration between social workers and lawyers is rare but
important to protect the state’s interest in the health and safety of children).
15. For the purpose of this Note, the term “complex cases” will mean cases in which
parents and their children live confined with unrelated adults and strangers in exclusive
communal living or “intentional community” situations that offer limited access to outsiders.
“Complex cases” will not be used to describe those who simply share a home with an unrelated
family, but those who intentionally choose communal living and seclude themselves from
mainstream society for religious, philosophical, economic, or other reasons. 
16. Kisthardt, supra note 14, at 21 (discussing social workers’ frustration, resentment,
and alienation toward the adversarial legal process that limits their role in child removal
decisions).
17. No legal scholarship covers the area of emergency removal of children from intentional
communities, thus this Note will attempt to suggest and balance factors based on issues
anticipated from or litigated in the Texas case. For a discussion of the rights of polygamist
parents in light of their illegal relationships with one another rather than alleged
mistreatment of their children, see R. Michael Otto, “Wait til Your Mothers Get Home”:
Assessing the Rights of Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REV.
881.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a right to file civil cases in federal court when a
person acting “under color of any statute” causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”).
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Amendment,19 and preventing intentional communities from
sheltering themselves in states with unclear standards for removal.
The Court adopted a constitutional standard for permanent removal
in traditional cases to resolve the first two of these issues;20 in the
same way, federal courts should recognize the essential interests at
stake and announce a standard that is functional and predictable in
complex cases.
This Note argues that courts should require a showing that
children are in substantial danger of harm by a preponderance of
the evidence in complex cases of temporary, emergency removal.
Because of the imprecision and unpredictability of impending abuse
in such cases, courts should not have to find exigent circumstances
in order to warrant removal. By choosing to live in isolation from
society and associate closely with child offenders, these parents
present increased risks that courts must consider when ruling on
the permissibility of a removal. If courts apply identical standards
in traditional and complex cases, states will not be able to suffi-
ciently protect children facing the unique risks of complex cases
because the children grow up confined with predators outside the
structure and protection of mainstream society. Part I of this Note
summarizes the history of the FLDS sect and the contemporary
prevalence of communal living groups, explains that the Eldorado
incident is not the first time child removal issues have arisen, and
explores Congress’s recent commitment to fight crime occurring in
these communities. Part II explains the rationale for instituting a
federal standard for complex child removal that balances the weight
of the government’s parens patriae interest in the health and well-
being of children against the fundamental right of parental liberty
as it has evolved under the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s balancing test
for Due Process, uses this test to formulate a proposed standard,
and then applies that standard to the government’s 2008 raid in
Eldorado. Finally, it concludes that states must elicit proof of a
substantial risk of physical or sexual child abuse by a preponder-
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (instituting “clear and convincing
evidence” as the minimum standard of proof required to permanently terminate parental
rights in any United States jurisdiction).
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ance of the evidence in order to justify temporary removals in
complex cases because the potentially devastating consequences of
widespread, institutional abuse and the difficulty of investigation
must be weighed fairly against the strong parental liberty interest.
I. HISTORY
After the Texas Supreme Court issued its ruling and FLDS
children returned to their homes, United States Senator Harry Reid
spoke about the presence of sect groups living on the fringes of
society.21 He labeled such groups a form of “organized crime” and
proposed before the Senate Judiciary Committee that federal and
state law enforcement officials partner to end the illegal conduct of
sects that have “wrongfully cloaked themselves in the trappings of
religion.”22 In addition to child abuse, statutory rape, and bigamy,
Senator Reid listed “welfare fraud, tax evasion, massive corruption
and strong-arm tactics to maintain what they think is the status
quo” as offenses committed by sect groups.23 After making these
assertions, he requested the creation of a task force to intervene.24
Although religious sects and communal living groups may seem like
a small problem in the United States, Senator Reid said the
problems they present “deserve[ ] national attention and federal
action.”25 A closer examination reveals that intentional communities
have presented reoccurring problems with unfortunate conse-
quences.
A. FLDS
The FLDS sect did not formally or intentionally split from the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS or Mormon
church).26 The LDS abandoned plural marriage in 1890,27 under
21. See Senator: Polygamous Sects Are ‘Form of Organized Crime,’ CNN, July 24, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/24/polygamy.hearing/index.html.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. MARTHA SONNTAG BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND 28 (1993).
27. Id. at 6.
1204 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1197
heavy pressure from the United States government.28 Over time, the
rift within the LDS belief system grew, as small communities
ignored the orders of the LDS hierarchy and clung to the practice of
plural marriage.29 Mainstream Mormon church leaders labeled
these communities “fundamentalist”30 and attempted to distinguish
them from the public’s perception of the LDS.31
Congress’s initial attempt to criminalize polygamy was the
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862.32 This statute, however, did not
significantly reduce LDS membership because the nation was
preoccupied with the Civil War and the Act was difficult to enforce.33
After the war ended and Americans turned their eye to protecting
the “basic moral fiber” of the nation,34 the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Reynolds v. United States35 upheld antipolygamy statutes and
their punishments as constitutional.36 Subsequent to this ruling,
fervent enforcement led to arrests and prosecutions that left at least
1000 Mormons imprisoned and over 10,000 more disenfranchised by
the end of the nineteenth century.37 Wilford Woodruff succeeded
Taylor in the office of LDS President,38 and he issued a “Manifesto”
commanding the faithful to obey “the law of the land” and terminate
the practice of plural marriage.39
28. See id. at 3-6.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 28.
31. See id. at 18 (noting that the LDS church changed its stance in two dramatically
different phases: “first, its covert authorization of continued new marriages and then, after
1910, its harsh disassociation not only from new marriages but from its [originally] authorized
post-1890 marriages [that] provided much of the impetus for the question to remain painfully
open in the minds of many faithful Latter-day Saints”). 
32. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
33. BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 3.
34. Id. at 4.
35. 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878).
36. Id. at 168 (holding that it was within Congress’s power to enact a statute criminalizing
polygamy in the territories); see also BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 4-5 (discussing antipolygamy
statutes from the late nineteenth century).
37. BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 5. These arrests overcrowded Arizona’s prisons, which led
Mormon President John Taylor to suggest that polygamists flee to foreign countries to avoid
stringent prosecution. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 6.
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Many Mormons believed this was apostasy, a concession with far
too high a price, and refused to accept it.40 They became the FLDS
and moved to isolated communities in order to pursue what they
believed was “the everlasting Gospel and the law of Plural Mar-
riage.”41 Since then, authorities near FLDS communities have
largely adopted “live-and-let-live attitude[s]” despite the FLDS
blatantly violating statutes outlawing polygamy.42
1. Short Creek Raid 
On July 26, 1953, Arizona Governor Howard Pyle engineered a
raid “to protect the lives and future of 263 children ... the product
and the victims of the foulest conspiracy ... a community dedicated
to the production of white slaves.”43 This was not the first raid on
FLDS sect members living in isolated polygamy in the Short Creek
region.44 It was, however, the first raid in which the government
took custody of Short Creek’s children.45
Utah and Arizona residents, unlike Texans following the
Eldorado incident,46 believed the 1953 intervention would actually
save the state money.47 Despite their geographic seclusion from
society, FLDS members living in Short Creek evoked resentment
from fellow citizens who both viewed polygamy as morally repug-
nant and harbored bitterness over the tax strain placed on them by
the abundance of children in the FLDS compound.48 Families living
in the compound benefited from publicly-funded child support and
education programs without contributing anything to the state’s
40. Id. at 19-20.
41. Id. at 28.
42. D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, AND EDUCATION
240, 276 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1991).
43. See BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 112-13.
44. See, e.g., id. at 68-71 (detailing a March 7, 1944, raid on the Short Creek region).
45. In the first raid on Short Creek (1935), the government arrested six adult church
leaders. Id. at 54. In the second raid (1944), the government arrested sixteen men and eight
women. Id. at 70. In the 1953 raid, the government arrested thirty-six men and eight women,
id. at 134, but also took custody of 153 children, id. at 137.
46. See Broughton, supra note 8.
47. BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 116.
48. Id.; see also id. at 148-52 (discussing public reaction to the raid).
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purse.49 With great encouragement from the local judge,50 Governor
Pyle convinced the Arizona legislature to appropriate funds for a
full-scale investigation into the Short Creek polygamists.51 
In order to gather sufficient evidence, Governor Pyle contracted
with a detective agency from California.52 Investigators from the
agency pretended to be a film crew interested in shooting a movie in
the Short Creek region and took surveillance photographs of the
community.53 Believing that the evidence made a compelling case
against the FLDS for unlawful cohabitation, Governor Pyle chose to
act, even without support from neighboring Utah.54 
When the matters reached the courtroom, the state moved to take
permanent custody of the children until a court resolved the legal
proceedings against their parents.55 For Arizona to gain permanent
custody, the state had to prove that each child was “neglected,
dependent or delinquent.”56 Although the specifics of each case for
the 263 children varied, the state’s argument consistently rested on
social workers’ belief that “the morals of said children are endan-
gered, and they are in danger of becoming law violators” if left with
their natural parents.57 Many potential witnesses declined to
testify,58 leading the Arizona Superior Court to conclude that “no
one had presented sufficient information to justify removal” of the
children from their families.59 Thus, the 1953 raid ended with all the
children removed by Arizona Child Protective Services officials
returning to their parents—the same result as the 2008 Texas raid.
In fact, the 2008 Eldorado raid bears a striking resemblance to
its 1953 Short Creek predecessor.60 During each raid, state law
49. Id. at 116 -18.
50. Id. at 117-18.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 119.
53. Id. at 119-20; see also id. at 131 (listing the charges against the fundamentalists as
contained in the arrest warrants, including rape, bigamy, and polygamous living).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 156.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 156-57.
59. Id. at 157.
60. See Geoffrey Fattah, Parallels to Short Creek Raid in 1953 Are Pointed Out, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 10, 2008, at A4 (quoting author and professor Martha Sonntag Bradley’s
assessment of the similarities between the Short Creek and Eldorado raids).
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enforcement and social workers descended on each of the com-
pounds in the early morning hours and left with hundreds of women
and children.61 In both cases, accusations of widespread child abuse
were aimed to raise popular support for the raids.62 Due to FLDS
members’ conservative, traditional dress, images of women and
children being ushered out of the community appeared “almost the
same as images from 1953.”63 Although FLDS leaders appear to
have anticipated both raids, neither incident involved violent
resistance.64
Unfortunately for state officials, both raids led to powerful
criticism of their ineffective strategies.65 In 1953, all the women and
children taken into custody by Arizona returned to their compound
and, after two months’ imprisonment, their husbands and fathers
returned on bail for charges the state never pursued.66
A case that arose from the 1953 raid sheds light on the extreme
shift in judicial attitudes toward the removal of children.67 Utah
officials, who had not participated in the initial raid, took custody
of a man’s children living on the Utah side of the border after he
was arrested by Arizona officials.68 The Utah Supreme Court held
that the children had been neglected and must be removed from
their parents because, by raising them in a polygamous household,
their parents had subjected them to “this illegal and immoral
practice in action” and taught them that polygamy is “God’s law and
that it is above the law of man.”69 Based on this finding of a moral,
not physical or emotional, risk to children, Utah permanently
removed Black’s children in 1955.70 By 2008, the judicial opinion
had shifted such that living behind a fence and mingling with
suspected perpetrators of sexual offenses does not satisfy the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In re Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
68. Id. at 888.
69. Id. at 910-11.
70. Id.
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conditions for temporary removal.71 FLDS officials consider the
Short Creek raid a testament to their fortitude in the face of
persecution, and allude to it with pride much the same way as
Texans remember the Alamo.72
2. Eldorado Raid
On Saturday, March 29, 2008, a Texas child protection hotline
received a telephone tip from a female claiming to be “Sarah,” a
married teenager living in the FLDS community at Zion Ranch
in Eldorado, Texas.73 “Sarah” told an operator that adult males
living in the Zion Ranch Community regularly engaged in abusing
teenage girls physically and sexually, and one adult male abused
her on multiple occasions.74 The Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services responded, searched the premises, and inter-
viewed its residents.75 Department officials discovered several facts
that led to their decision to remove more than 400 children from the
Zion Ranch.76 This information included: twenty females becoming
pregnant before the age of legal consent; the theory that the ranch
community actually consisted of “one household comprised of
extended family subgroups;” and the lead investigator’s assessment
that a “pervasive belief system” conditioned young girls to become
willing victims of grown men.77 Proceeding with these as their chief
71. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613-15 (Tex.
2008) (holding the Department’s allegations that a community had a culture of polygamy and
of directing underage girls to enter unions with older men and bear children did not warrant
a grant of emergency custody to the Department of the 468 children living in the community
at a church-related ranch).
72. Fattah, supra note 60.
73. In re Tex., 255 S.W.3d at 613.
74. Id.
75. See In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. App. 2008).
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at *1-2 (explaining in full their reasons for removal: “Interviews with investigators
revealed a pattern of girls reporting that ‘there was no age too young for girls to be married’;
Twenty females living at the ranch had become pregnant between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen; Five of the twenty females identified as having become pregnant between the ages
of thirteen and seventeen are alleged to be minors, the other fifteen are now adults; Of the
five minors who became pregnant, four are seventeen and one is sixteen, and all five are
alleged to have become pregnant at the age of fifteen or sixteen; The Department’s lead
investigator was of the opinion that due to the ‘pervasive belief system’ of the FLDS, the male
children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and the girls are raised to be victims
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arguments, Department officers went to court to defend their
removal decision. Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court found that
the facts shown by Department officials failed to state a case that
warranted removal.78 Echoing the lower Texas appellate decision,
the Texas Supreme Court stated the Department failed to meet its
burden of proof for removal under the applicable statute.79 The
court’s ruling allowed lower courts to take alternative measures to
ensure the children’s safety and the investigation’s success.80 These
measures included “an order ‘restraining a party from removing the
child beyond a geographical area identified by the court,’” “removal
of an alleged perpetrator from the child’s home,” and “orders to
assist the Department in its investigation.”81 Elaborating on its
holding more than the Texas Supreme Court did, the appellate court
revealed that in order to justify removal, the Department would
have needed to make specific showings of a propensity to subject
children to physical or sexual abuse for each household within the
ranch from which children were removed.82 After the Texas
Supreme Court ruling, all the children were returned to the custody
of their parents under guidelines similar to those recommended by
the Texas Supreme Court, restricting the childrens’ association with
suspects.83 Department officials sought foster care for eight of the
children within two months because their parents failed to comply
with the protective measures instituted by the court and allowed
them to come into contact with suspected or charged sexual
offenders.84 Court proceedings are pending for twelve FLDS men
of sexual abuse; All 468 children were removed from the ranch under the theory that the
ranch community was ‘essentially one household comprised of extended family subgroups’
with a single, common belief system and there was reason to believe that a child had been
sexually abused in the ranch ‘household’; [and] Department witnesses expressed the opinion
that there is a ‘pervasive belief system’ among the residents of the ranch that it is acceptable
for girls to marry, engage in sex, and bear children as soon as they reach puberty, and that
this ‘pervasive belief system’ poses a danger to the children” (footnotes omitted)).
78. See In re Tex., 255 S.W.3d at 615.
79. Id. at 614-15 & nn.1-9 (quoting Texas Family Code Sections 262.105, 262.201(b)-(c),
261.303(a), and 261.3032).
80. Id. at 615.
81. Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1.
83. State Requests Foster Care for 8 FLDS Children, CNN, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/2008/CRIME/08/05/polygamy/index.html.
84. Id.
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arrested in conjunction with this investigation; charges include
felony aggravated sexual assault, bigamy, tampering with evidence,
and failure to report child abuse.85
B. Modern Day Communal Living
Although it is difficult to track the number of nontraditional
communities that currently operate within the United States
(potentially leading to complex cases), a database lists 1201.86
Seventy-five of these communities openly advertise teenagers (the
most vulnerable population demographic in the FLDS case87) among
their numbers.88
Though no one could seriously describe intentional communities
as “pervasive” in any region, they have sustained a sizable and
continuous population in the country for over a century, particularly
in the southwest.89 Brushes with the law have come along with this
presence, the largest and most notorious being the raids and mass
child removals in 1953 and 2008.90 These large-scale attempts to
bring communities into compliance with the state’s child protective
interest have been discouraged by wasted time and money in failed
raids. Still, federal lawmakers vow they will not allow frontier
communities to persist with illegal behavior.91
85. Terri Langford, 8 More Indictments Issued in FLDS Polygamist Case, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 13, 2008, at B3. The first of the twelve charged, Jessop, was convicted of sexual assault
of a child and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. At his trial, new insight into the
treatment of children at the Zion Ranch developed through testimony that the victim in this
case was one of the defendant’s nine wives, and that she was originally assigned to the
defendant’s brother before being “‘reassigned’ to Jessop.” Eleven more trials will follow.
Associated Press, Polygamist Sect Member Sentenced to 10 Years, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Nov. 11, 2009, www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/2009/11/11/1111jessop.
html.
86. Intentional Communities Database, http://icdb.org/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
87. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 613 (Tex. 2008)
(discussing the Texas Department of Protective Services’ concern that the FLDS community
had a culture of directing teenage girls to enter spiritual unions with older men and have
children).
88. Id.
89. See Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353,
353-54 (2003) (discussing the FLDS community population in the southwest).
90. Fattah, supra note 60.
91. Senator: Polygamous Sects Are ‘Form of Organized Crime,’ supra note 21.
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II. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL STANDARD
As federal task forces seek to intercede in the “organized crime”
that intentional communities allegedly perpetuate,92 federal and
state agents must have an understandable framework through
which to evaluate the data they gather. Successfully and predictably
determining which situations warrant emergency removal and when
to seek court approval before intervening will be essential to the
success of this venture. More complex cases will develop as this
initiative gets underway and parents will likely invoke their Due
Process rights in an attempt to avoid the ramifications of emergency
removal.93 Instituting a federal standard to clarify how courts may
92. Id.
93. Parents may also attempt to invoke First Amendment and Equal Protection rights to
stop state intervention. Those challenges, however, are outside the scope of this Note. 
For a description of Equal Protection challenges in traditional child removal cases, see Kate
Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse Registries at the Intersection of
Child Protection, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 31-34 (2001).
Communal living groups are not a strictly suspect or suspect class under current Supreme
Court case law and are not likely to become one because the Court only affords this protection
when a class “is ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (describing the criteria for finding a strictly suspect
class and finding that social economic class does not qualify). States traditionally leave
intentional communities to their own devices and they do not face extensive government
interference or discrimination. See Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, or
Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 43, 67-68 (2009) (noting that intentional
communities need isolation from society in order to survive).
Religious sects, particularly the FLDS, are highly likely to lodge complaints that their First
Amendment rights have been violated when facing the removal of their children en masse.
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 631, 663 (2006) (noting the free exercise rights of noncustodial parents). However, the
First Amendment does not unconditionally allow all activity guised as the practice of
“religion.” See supra note 35 (Supreme Court upheld restriction on polygamy). The Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence allows the government to regulate the practice of religion
when the government demonstrates a “compelling governmental interest” and vindicates that
interest by employing the “least restrictive means.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (holding the government must show a compelling
interest in order to restrict the practice of religion that citizens otherwise enjoy). Because
courts have already shown deference to the major societal goal of protecting children from
sexual abuse, they should find it is a compelling government interest. Mary Ellen Reilly,
Expert Testimony on Sexually Abused Child Syndrome in a Child Protective Proceeding: More
Hurtful than Helpful, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y ETHICS J. 419, 454 (2005) (stating that “courts
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balance the Due Process rights of parents and children would not
only make removal determinations more expedient but also would
likely follow precedent. The Supreme Court has already imple-
mented a federal, constitutional standard determining the standard
of proof required in all permanent child removals.94 Recognizing the
necessity of a minimum federal standard to protect parental rights
against excessive state action in permanent removals logically calls
for the creation of a similar constitutional minimum for temporary
removal. Some may argue that federal courts should leave tempo-
rary removal standards to local authorities because the rights at
stake do not have as great of consequences. Temporary removal
could, however, undermine a parent’s relationship with his or her
child, cause resentment on the part of the child who fails to
understand his or her plight, or lead to victimization in the state’s
custodial facilities.95 This standard would not instruct the govern-
ment when it must act, but it would merely solidify when temporary
intervention is constitutionally permissible. Neglecting to create a
federal standard fails to balance adequately both the state’s “urgent
interest” in the welfare of children and the effect of nonintervention
on abused or neglected minors who the state cannot expect to serve
as their own advocates.96 By ignoring widespread abuse occurring
in small communities outside the realm of mainstream society, the
state implicitly condones these abusive practices and fails to
vindicate the rights of its most dependent citizens. A federal
standard will ensure both parents and children have their rights
guarded in a clear, consistent, and predictable manner. Parental
rights are not absolute even in traditional cases,97 and complex
cases must lead to closer scrutiny by the state because of their
isolation from society and potential to hide long-standing instances
of abuse.
... use ... a less stringent evidentiary standard on the grounds that preventing sexual abuse
is a major societal and judicial concern”).
94. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (instituting “clear and convincing
evidence” as the minimum standard of proof required to permanently terminate parental
rights in any United States jurisdiction).
95. Id. at 789 n.15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that unnecessary stays in foster care
may have “deleterious effects” on children’s development into responsible, productive citizens).
96. Id. at 766.
97. See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir. 1987).
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A. Relevance of a Federal Standard
Opponents of a federal standard will likely raise the objection
that the formulation of a federal standard would not serve a
significant purpose. Child removal involves state officials enforcing
state law, thus the issue would rarely, if ever, reach federal court.
This objection fails to consider civil actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Supreme Court’s ultimate jurisdiction over federal
questions arising in state courts.
Originally known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress enacted §
1983 to protect oppressed minorities from discriminatory state
government officials acting “under [the] color of” state law.98 The
statute’s text does not restrict its applicability to racially discrimi-
natory practices but also protects against “the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.”99 Though commonly used as the launching point for civil
actions alleging state discrimination against members of protected
classes, parents frequently invoke § 1983 after state officials remove
their children without a hearing.100 These claims focus on the
parents’ allegation that state social workers have infringed their
fundamental right of parental liberty without providing a proper
venue to contest the propriety of such action.101 In these actions,
federal courts may not only award monetary damages to parents
when states have violated their rights, but also formulate appropri-
ate equitable relief, including returning removed children to their
parents.102 Following the Eldorado Raid, decisions by Texas appel-
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see also Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1012
(2008) (describing the introduction and early application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
99. Id.
100. E.g., Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003); Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982
(10th Cir. 2002); Mabe v. San Bernadino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101 (9th
Cir. 2001); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d
333 (4th Cir. 1994) (ruling on temporary removal cases brought to federal court under § 1983).
101. See, e.g., Roska, 304 F.3d at 993; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1104; Jordan, 15 F.3d at 337.
102. See, e.g., Coe v. Ziegler, 657 F. Supp. 182, 183, 187 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (ordering
injunctive relief for parents who were “under a present threat of having their children
removed from their legal and physical custody,” contingent on the juvenile court system
failing to comply with the parent’s request within twenty days); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006) (including as a possible remedy a “suit in equity or other proper proceeding for
redress”).
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late courts rendered filing federal claims unnecessary, but counsel
for the FLDS parents likely would have advised their clients to seek
relief in federal court if their state claims had failed, as many
parents in traditional cases have.
In addition, any state court of last resort decision that rests on an
interpretation of the United States Constitution may be appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.103 States may argue that their
statutes provide independent and adequate state grounds, but when
the statutes provide for removal without a prior court proceeding,
parents raise valid constitutional concerns.104 The losing party could
appeal the court’s decision requesting the Supreme Court to weigh
due process rights of parents against the state’s own interests.
Though parents in complex cases have not chosen this route, they
could choose to assert their due process rights rather than argue the
semantics of the state’s removal statute.105 If they did so, the highest
state court’s holding could be appealed by the losing party and
would reach the Supreme Court for a final holding on the constitu-
tional protection of parental rights against temporary, emergency
removal.106 The Supreme Court could then have the chance to decide
the extent of constitutional protections, a decision that would bind
all states to a minimum due process standard.
Although much litigation in complex cases has arisen out of state
court findings (especially those in Texas and Utah),107 § 1983 and
the presentation of federal questions in state court both point to the
fact that a federal standard would serve a significant purpose. In
light of these inroads to federal court, the Supreme Court’s decision
to set a minimum standard for permanent removal seems reasoned
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.”).
104. Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976)
(holding that “[w]e are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [State] law by the
highest court of the State”).
105. E.g., Doe, 329 F.3d at 1293 (discussing parents’ argument that a Florida statute that
authorized emergency removal of their children was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
and Fourth Amendments).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
107. E.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008); In re
Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
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and supports a similar standard for temporary removal in complex
cases. 
B. Parens Patriae
According to the parens patriae interest, the state has standing
to intercede on behalf of its citizens and secure justice for the most
defenseless in cases in which they face a “legal disability.”108 States
can bring parens patriae actions in two categories: “First, a State
has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general [and] [s]econd, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.”109 All parens
patriae litigation has emerged from these two categories.
Courts have found a state’s interest in the health and well-being
of children fits within the first category. “[T]he state, as parens
patriae, has a significant interest in protecting children from abuse
and maltreatment ... [T]he unfortunate reality [is] that children are
often victimized, and that the state has a strong interest in
protecting them from the infliction of physical harm by those
charged with their care.”110 Through this established interest, states
regularly intercede on behalf of minors in traditional child removal
cases.
The Supreme Court affirmed the strength of this interest in
Prince v. Massachusetts, stating “the state as parens partriae may
restrict the parent’s control.... Its authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of
conduct on religion or conscience.”111 This holding clarifies that the
state may still restrict parental liberty, even combined with
enumerated First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, to protect
minors from the ill effects of their parents’ spiritual persuasion.112
108. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
109. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
110. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982), for the strength of the “state's interest in protection of children”).
111. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that parental liberty does
not extend to a mother dispatching her daughter to distribute religious bulletins proclaiming
the faith of Jehovah’s Witnesses).
112. See id.
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The doctrine of parens patriae provides the legal framework for
the state to intercede on behalf of abused minors, individually or en
masse, and it is the legal basis for creating a lower standard in
complex cases.
C. Finding Parental Liberty in Substantive Due Process 
In contrast, parents’ interest in the freedom to raise their children
as they see fit is protected by the Constitution.113 In a series of cases
starting in the early twentieth century, the Court found parental
liberty among the fundamental rights that could not be removed
under the Fourteenth Amendment without due process of law.114
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters
Parens patriae is an extremely powerful and potentially danger-
ous tool of the state.115 If allowed to exist unchecked, the power
could provide the groundwork for any number of overbearing and
controlling state actions under the color of the state’s urgent
interest in child welfare.116 Although neither the Constitution nor
the Bill of Rights spells out a specific fundamental right to parental
liberty that checks parens patriae, the Supreme Court has read
parental liberty as a fundamental freedom that cannot be removed
without due process.117 The Court first found this parental right in
a pair of cases arising early in the twentieth century, both of which
involved parental decisions regarding education.118
113. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 531-35 (1925).
114. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
115. See supra notes 111-12; see also Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the
State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 690 (1998).
116. See Brown, supra note 13, at 941 (detailing the history of America’s use of the parens
patriae doctrine, and asserting that in the nineteenth century, “America's parens patriae
interest in children was a function of crime-control, not the well-being of children” (footnote
omitted)).
117. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; see also Katharine A. Higgins-Shea,
Note, On the Clock: Should State Law Require Child Welfare Workers To Consider Whether
There is Sufficient Time To Obtain Judicial Authorization When Effecting Emergency
Removals of Children from Their Parents?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 147, 150-53 (2004).
118. Higgins-Shea, supra note 117, at 150-51.
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In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that Nebraska’s refusal to
include a foreign language in public school curriculum was “arbi-
trary and without reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the State.”119 The Court construed the State’s action
as a violation, not of students’ rights as the ones who wished to
enroll in the banned classes, but of the parents’ rights to determine
freely their children’s curriculum as implied in the “liberty” of the
Fourteenth Amendment.120 This holding opened the door for parents
to invoke their rights to determine their children’s upbringing,
without addressing issues of neglectful or abusive parenting. 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court extended the
fundamental right found in Meyer to forbid states from forcing
children to attend public school, because doing so “unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children.”121 The Supreme Court
applied a rational basis test, finding that standardizing children by
indoctrinating them all at the same school was not a “purpose
within the competency of the State” because “[t]he child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”122 The Court considered
“custody, care, and nurture of children” as the rights of a parent.123
These two cases marked milestones for parental liberty and
autonomy to determine the best interests of their children, recogniz-
ing parental liberty as a fundamental right protected by due process
rights.124 The Court maintained a rational basis test, however,
requiring only a reasonable relation to a proper state objective to
defeat parental liberty and did not address concerns raised by unfit
parenting.125 Meyer and Pierce both occurred within the context of
parents actively pursuing what they believed was best for their
children. Neither case addressed the issue of protections for parents
accused of abusive or neglectful treatment of their children. In this
119. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
120. Id. at 400-03.
121. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
122. Id. at 535.
123. Higgins-Shea, supra note 117, at 151.
124. Id. at 150-51.
125. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
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era, the Supreme Court is likely to lower the standard of proof for
temporary child removal in complex cases if such a case reaches
Supreme Court review.
2. Prince v. Massachusetts
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court finally addressed the
interplay of parens patriae and parental liberty in a case that
involved detrimental parental conduct (as opposed to parental
challenges to state educational policies).126 In this case, an aunt
provided her niece, of whom she was the custodian, with Jehovah’s
Witness magazines knowing that her niece would sell them illegally
in the street.127 Holding that the state had a valid parens patriae
interest in restricting the conduct that trumped the aunt’s custodial
and religious freedoms, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the
“state cannot enter” the “private realm of family life,” but that “the
family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest.”128 Thus,
the Court allowed the state to prosecute the aunt for her conduct,
finding that a guardian’s rights do not override the parens patriae
interest of the state simply because they involve religion.129
Although Prince may stand for the proposition of privacy in
family life and an argument can be made that the Supreme Court
only allowed the guardian to be penalized because of the public
nature of the magazine distribution, this case clearly places
qualifications on that privacy.130 The Prince Court realized the
danger in allowing children to participate unconditionally in the
religious practices of their parents or guardians, especially those
that require interaction with people outside the family unit, and
would not hesitate to allow states to regulate private and reclusive
societies when religious liberty cloaks child abuse and moles-
tation.131 Creating a lower standard for state intervention in
complex cases squares with the Supreme Court’s holding in Prince.
126. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159-60 (1944).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 166.
129. Id. at 166-67, 170.
130. Id. at 166.
131. See id. at 166, 169-70.
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3. Santosky v. Kramer
Prince dealt with state punishment of a parent or guardian, but
the punishment did not rise to the level of removing the parent’s
custody rights.132 As of the early 1980s, the Supreme Court had not
dictated a federal standard for balancing parens patriae and
parental liberty.133 In 1982, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue
of terminating parental rights in the case Santosky v. Kramer.134
New York enacted a statute allowing the state to gain permanent
custody of children if it made a showing by “a fair preponderance of
the evidence” that the children were “permanently neglected.”135 The
Supreme Court found, however, that the risk of inappropriately
taking custody of nonneglected children dictated a higher stand-
ard.136 When moving to terminate the natural parents’ rights, New
York emphasized observations of parent/child interaction that
occurred while the children were in foster care—visits the state said
were “devoid of any real emotional content” and that the parents
demonstrated a lack of ability to “plan[ ] for the future of the[ ]
children.”137 These observations did not amount to sufficient evi-
dence for the Court to allow permanent removal.138
The Supreme Court found that states could not invoke the parens
patriae interest to rationalize permanently eliminating parental
liberty with a lowered standard of proof.139 The Court held that
“[b]efore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of
parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State
support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”140
Thus, the Court created a federal standard of proof for permanent
removal.
Significantly, the Court distinguished temporary removal from
permanent removal of parental custody.141 The Court left undis-
132. See id. at 166.
133. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 747.
136. Id. at 747-48.
137. Id. at 751-52.
138. Id. at 747-48.
139. Id. at 747-48, 758.
140. Id. at 747-48.
141. Id. at 777-80.
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turbed New York’s temporary removal based on the appearance of
neglect, allowing the State to remove, rehabilitate, and then reunite
the children with their parents after it was satisfied that the
parents were fit.142 By doing so, the Supreme Court, unlike the
Texas Supreme Court, recognized the gravity of an error in a
permanent removal decision as far greater than that in a temporary
removal.143 The Santosky model, which advances the importance of
immediate safety and protection of children before ensuring that
they reunite safely with their parents, provides an example of how
courts must treat complex cases.
4. Troxel v. Granville
A dispute over the visitation rights of third parties helped the
Court define the weight given to Due Process claims concerning the
infringement of parental liberty. In Troxel v. Granville, paternal
grandparents claimed a right to extend their hours of visitation with
their grandchildren.144 State law in Washington allowed third
parties to petition state courts for the visitation rights of any child,
even if the child’s parent objected.145 The Troxels’ son passed away
and their grandchildren’s mother restricted the grandparents’
opportunity to spend time with their grandchildren.146 Granville, the
mother, stated that her preference and opinion of the best interests
of her children should outweigh the grandparents’ rights.147
The Troxel Court held that parental liberty in the care and
custody of one’s children must be afforded “at least some special
weight.”148 This “weight” led the Court to decide that “the Due
Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamen-
tal right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because
142. Id. at 748-52.
143. See id. But see In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App.
May 22, 2008).
144. 530 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2000) (reviewing whether the children’s mother could limit the
grandparents to one visit a month but not eliminate their rights of visitation completely).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240(1) (2009), invalidated by In re Parentage of C.A.M.A.,
109 P.3d 405 (Wash. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2009).
146. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61.
147. Id. at 69.
148. Id. at 70.
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a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”149 Rather,
in order to substitute the court’s judgment for that of a fit parent,
the decision that the court favors must be imposed only if it
outweighs the decision of the parent by a substantial amount;
additional weight is given to parental judgment under the presump-
tion that parents know best how to vindicate the best interests of
their children.150
Throughout Troxel, the Supreme Court continued to distinguish
those parents that benefit from this presumption as “fit” and
“adequate.”151 The Court even began its analysis with the assertion
that “the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that
Granville was an unfit parent.”152 The Court did not state what
presumption, if any, is given to parents alleged to be unfit, but its
constant assertion of the fact that Granville was fit makes it clear
that unfit or allegedly unfit parents do not benefit from the same
presumption.153 This presumption would not negatively affect a
decision to form a lower federal standard of proof applicable in
complex cases. The fact that the Court saw such a distinction
between the rights of fit and unfit (or even allegedly unfit) parents
suggests that the Court would favor a lowered federal standard or
presumption for parents living in intentional communities with
suspected child abusers.
5. Circuit Split over Temporary Emergency Action
In modern American culture, citizens often take for granted the
fundamental right to parental liberty, perceiving it as equivalent to
149. Id. at 72-73 (disapproving of the Superior Court’s statement, “I look back on some
personal experiences .... We always spen[t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and
another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out
to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out”). 
150. Id. at 70.
151. Id. at 67-68.
152. Id. at 68.
153. Id. at 67-70, 72 (“Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children, (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to interject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”).
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the Bill of Rights.154 This modern conception makes reviewing the
Supreme Court’s recent extension of parental liberty highly impor-
tant. Parental liberty is often extended to lengths that are beyond
the limits that the Court has expressed, such as the temporary
custody of children whose parents are accused or suspected of
abusing their children or allowing them to be abused. The Court has
not made it clear in previous cases that allegedly unfit parents have
a fundamental interest in constant, uninterrupted care and custody
of their children. The Court has certainly not stated that parents
who present risk factors that indicate the probability of abuse and
neglect retain this fundamental right. 
In the line of cases examined thus far, the Supreme Court has
made definitive statements about parents on each end of the
parental spectrum. It has found a fundamental right of liberty to
protect the decision making of those who are presumptively fit.155
For parents in danger of permanently losing care and custody of
their children due to repeated accusations of abuse or neglect, the
Court has enacted a heightened standard of proof.156 The United
States Courts of Appeals have examined a third variety of cases,
those where only temporary custody measures are at stake, and
have arrived at varying conclusions.157
None of the United States Courts of Appeals have fashioned a
precise standard for temporary removal in the way the Supreme
Court has for permanent removal.158 They have, however, examined
whether child protection officials must first seek court approval of
proposed temporary intervention by attaining a warrant or court
order before removing children.159 The majority of appellate courts
154. See, e.g., Free the FLDS Children-AKA The Freedom Liberty Defenders Society,
http://www.flds.ws/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (purporting to defend “Due Process, Religious
Liberty, Human Rights, [and] Constitutional Rights” in advocating for total parental liberty
in FLDS communities).
155. E.g., Troxel, 570 U.S. at 68-70.
156. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
157. For the courts of appeals’ various opinions on temporary removal proceedings, see Doe
v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003); Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 993 (10th
Cir. 2002); Mabe v. San Bernadino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1108-09
(9th Cir. 2001); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 607 (2d Cir. 1999); and Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994).
158. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 477-78 (standard for permanent removal).
159. See supra note 157.
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hold that “removal of children from the custody of their parents in
emergency circumstances without judicial authorization” is allowed
regardless of whether the state makes a specific finding that there
is “sufficient time to obtain judicial authorization.”160 They have
held that the risk of harm to children, combined with the parens
patriae interest, outweighs parental liberty in close cases where
abuse or neglect are alleged.161
By favoring the parens patriae interest and deciding in favor of
protection over court process when children are in imminent risk of
harm, federal appellate cases suggest that these courts would look
favorably on removal in complex cases.162 From these holdings it
seems likely that the majority of federal appellate courts would
approve a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for removal in
emergency or imminent risk situations and these courts would not
require a finding that there existed insufficient time for preinter-
vention process.163 A Supreme Court decision holding time inessen-
tial as a factor in complex cases would clarify the proper balance of
the fundamental interests at stake in these cases and would provide
a clear mandate for child protective service professionals.
III. FORMULATING AND APPLYING THE STANDARD
To determine whether the evidence presented warrants the
removal of children in complex cases, courts should employ a
“preponderance of the evidence” test that probes whether it is more
likely than not that children are in serious danger, without at-
160. Higgins-Shea, supra note 117, at 157 (citing Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733 (10th
Cir. 1997) and Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000)). But see Tenenbaum,
193 F.3d at 593-95; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1106, 1108-09 (requiring a court finding that no
sufficient time existed to obtain judicial authorization prior to the removal).
161. See supra note 160.
162. See supra note 160. A warrant is not necessary for temporary removal of children from
dangers in the home, and thus the majority of courts have decided to place the risk of error
on the parents. Maintaining the same level of caution in regard to the safety of children, it is
likely that courts would not require a warrant or a finding of insufficient time to obtain one
to justify removal in complex cases.
163. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48, 758, 764-66, 769-70. When striking down the
preponderance of the evidence standard for parental rights termination proceedings, the
Court emphasized the severe nature of permanent removal. The Court noted New York’s
temporary removal procedure and did not question the authority or justification for state
officials to intercede temporarily. Id. at 748.
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tempting to embed a determination of “sufficient time” that would
confuse the issues and force courts to rule on matters of speculation.
In order to ensure that both the state’s parens patriae interest and
parental Due Process rights receive protection, the Court should
neither lower the standard below a preponderance of the evidence
nor heighten scrutiny to the clear and convincing evidence standard.
A. Three Factor Due Process Test
When faced with cases that present a conflict between important
governmental interests and recognized Due Process rights, courts
must evaluate the weight of each interest. This creates a fluid
process that at times seems unpredictable.164 In order to fashion a
workable and more predictable standard, the Supreme Court has
stated certain factors to weigh when determining such cases.165 The
three factors that courts currently weigh in determining whether a
state practice violates parental Due Process are: 
[f]irst the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; [s]econd the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if
any, of additional ... procedural safeguards; and finally the
Government’s interest, including the ... fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedur[es]
would entail.166
Neatly isolating the issues involved in child removal, especially
in complex cases, proves difficult and frustrating, but finding the
best way of separating them serves as a first step toward making
sense of complex cases. Addressing the factors in the order pre-
sented above, courts will consider the parents’ interest first, then
the risk of error along with possible alternatives, and lastly the cost
to the government.167 Both the financial cost and cost to the govern-
164. See Higgins-Shea, supra note 117, at 152-53 (“Due process is a flexible concept ... there
are no fixed or rigid requirements in order to satisfy it.”).
165. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1975).
166. Id. at 335.
167. Id.
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ment’s interests, for example, the parens patriae interest, will be
addressed in this Section.  
1. Weight of the Parents’ Interest
Parents who defend their rights in complex cases maintain a
strong interest in retaining custody of their children.168 Often their
unique belief system has caused them to raise their children in a
sheltered and secluded manner, one that does not translate well to
foster care after removal.169 These parents believe they are seeking
the best for their children by guiding them in stringent religious
observance and have cultivated close relationships that children
depend on emotionally and psychologically.170 This reliance and the
potential detriment caused by its disruption, though difficult to
quantify neatly, weighs strongly in favor of maintaining a standard
that prevents careless and baseless removal.
The parents’ choice to continue living in secluded communities,
however, cuts two ways. Parents must consider that literally fencing
themselves off from interaction with society makes unobtrusive
investigation of alleged abuse impossible and, despite the difficulty
of investigation, the state maintains a strong interest in preventing
such abuse. Although parental belief systems alone are not suffi-
cient to initiate removal proceedings, belief systems may lead
parents to continue to place their children at risk because they
remain loyal to their perception of a higher law and do not see the
sexual practices of men in their community as harmful to
children.171 Thus, there is a greater logical link between the belief
system of the community and revictimization of children than the
Texas Court of Appeals found. As the proceedings in Texas have
168. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008)
(stating that emergency, temporary removal, including removal from a complex community,
is an “extreme measure” that courts can only justify when “the circumstances indicate ... the
need for protection of the children is so urgent that immediate removal of the children from
the home is necessary”).
169. Terri Langford, Richard Stewart & Janet Elliot, Polygamist Sect Children Present a
Cultural Challenge for Foster-Care Facilities, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2008, at A1 (describing
attempts by foster parents to relate to the FLDS children).
170. E.g., SONNTAG BRADLEY, supra note 26, at 110-11 (giving an example of a parent-child
relationship in a polygamous home).
171. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.
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demonstrated, familial bonds in complex cases run deep and
mothers may disrespect court orders designed to prevent further
abuse.172
Certainly the parental interests in the Texas case were very
strong, if not fundamental. The rights under consideration, however,
are temporary custody rights, not permanent ones.173 Although
parents and their advocates may advance an argument that
parental rights have not been sufficiently protected under this
standard, the difference between permanent and temporary removal
warrants lowering the standard.174 A firm “preponderance of the
evidence” standard, one that requires that children “more likely
than not” are in danger before removal is warranted, would satisfy
this purpose.
2. Risk of Error and Alternative Measures
The risk of potential errors weighs heavily on both sides.
Certainly foster care is not ideal and no child will view separation
from his or her parents as a pleasant occurrence, but the risk of
leaving children in contact with abusive or neglectful parents and
community members may have even more devastating results.175
One author has argued that courts should not remove children
without prior approval (in the same way that adults are civilly
committed) because “adults—even those suspected of mental
illness—are generally better able to care for themselves than are
children.”176 “[P]ain inflicted on innocent parents when children are
wrongly removed greatly exceeds the harm caused by wrongful
arrests and commitments of adults,”177 “modern definitions of child
172. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also State Requests Foster Care for 8
FLDS Children, supra note 83.
173. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1999)) (restating the principle that “brief removals
generally do not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation, at least where the
purpose of the removal is to keep the child safe during investigation and court confirmation
of the basis for removal”).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 13, at 925 n.75 (describing the poor conditions in foster
homes).
176. Id. at 970.
177. Id.
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abuse tend to be fluffy and vague,”178 and “removal carries with it a
large measure of moral approbation.”179 The fragility of children and
the potential mental anguish of mothers in the community subse-
quent to a false removal strongly reaffirm that states cannot take
removal lightly, even if temporary.
The fact that children are vulnerable weighs more strongly
toward the conclusion that they should be removed. Sexually
Abused Child Syndrome is a medically recognized mental condition
brought on by the infliction of sexual abuse on children, and it
manifests itself in many ways.180 Leaving children in situations in
which the preponderance of the evidence indicates ongoing institu-
tional abuse will likely lead to permanent damage to their mental
health and stability.
Texas’s appellate courts presumably believed that protective
measures will sufficiently protect children.181 Returning children to
their mothers and asking their mothers not to return to their loved
ones proved unrealistic.182 Another alternative—removing adult
parents, suspected of abuse, from their homes and taking them
into custody to prevent them from returning into contact with
their children—would constitute a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.183 In order to sustain a seizure and not face civil rights
lawsuits, law enforcement officials would need probable cause.184
Yet, the difficulty of investigation, lack of cooperation by fellow
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Reilly, supra note 93, at 436 (“Sexualized behavior ... is the most commonly cited
symptom of sexual abuse. Other symptoms frequently attributed to sexually abused children
include ‘impaired trust, withdrawal, depression, guilt, shame, anxiety, and hyper vigilance.’”
(footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d
404, 429 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that imminent danger of sexual abuse may justify seizing a
child from his parents without a warrant); Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 520 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding that an objectively reasonable basis for believing sexual abuse occurred
justified an immediate removal from the child’s home without court order).
181. State Requests Foster Care for 8 FLDS Children, supra note 83 (describing restrictions
such as requiring mothers of “children who lived in a home with a man who married underage
girls or agreed to an arranged marriage of an underage daughter ... to keep the children away
from that man"). 
182. Id. (stating that Department officials reinitiated custody proceedings against the
parents of eight children within two months of the children’s return because of the parents’
refusal to comply with these protective measures).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. Id.
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members of the community, and the scale of the investigation would
make it impossible to remove all potential perpetrators and ensure
child safety.185 Seizing parents with probable cause, instead of
removing children under the state’s parens patriae interest, is
simply not a tenable alternative in complex cases. 
The likelihood of abuse and the potentially lingering conse-
quences outweigh the risks associated with temporary removal as
long as the risk is shown to be serious and substantiated by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
3. Costs to the Government
There are a variety of costs to the government associated with
removal. Certainly the financial costs of removal can be extremely
steep, especially in complex cases in which dozens or even hundreds
of children may have to be transported, fed, and sheltered.186
Coupled with the cost of court proceedings and parental appeals, the
state may impinge both its budget and reputation (if the removal is
found to be unwarranted).187 On the other hand, a state that allows
mass child abuse to continue uninterrupted in complex communi-
ties will also damage its reputation, lessen its parens patriae
interest in children and their future, and face the possibility of a
steep tax burden.188 Overall, when the evidence gathered suggests
that children of a complex community “more likely than not” are
suffering abuse, not intervening is arguably more costly to the
government than intervening.
In order to trigger the government’s parens patriae interest, the
court must find “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving
rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in
imminent danger of abuse.”189 In the FLDS cases, or similar complex
185. See Corrie MacLaggan, Year After Raid, Bills Consider Removal Policy, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2009, at A1 (noting the problems of removing perpetrators).
186. See Broughton, supra note 8 (discussing the seven million dollar price tag of the FLDS
removals). 
187. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing the tax bill Utah and
Arizona were footing to provide welfare and child support to the Short Creek community
whose residents did not pay any taxes).
189. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir.
1997).
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cases involving exclusively male sexual abuse of females, mothers
will likely raise the point that the government may not “interpose
itself between a fit parent and her children simply because of the
conduct—real or imagined—of the other parent.”190 The government
may interpose itself, however, when the parent’s consent to place
her child in a position of high risk itself makes the parent unfit.191
The government’s interest in protecting children from emotional,
physical, and psychological injury must allow social workers to
perform their duties. By invoking their professional expertise and
instincts,192 without asking them to weigh difficult hypothetical
“prudent person” legal standards that do not translate to their
methods of training, state social workers will work more efficiently.
Studies show that “social workers may be able to transcend
boundaries of distrust with children and families better than legal
professionals” because “social workers become the conduit for
information that all the professionals in the process need for
effective decision-making.”193 Although courts must ultimately place
a check on social workers to ensure that they are performing their
tasks both accurately and legally, the standard must reflect the
experience and expertise social workers possess. A “preponderance
of the evidence” or “more likely than not” standard would both serve
as a check on the power of social workers and provide legal and
social work professionals with a clear standard.
B. Applying the Standard in the Texas Case
Applying this standard to complex cases will create more efficient
and uniform results. It will allow child protective social workers to
incorporate their expertise and predict when courts will sustain
removal. However, applying the standard retroactively to the Texas
190. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1142 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a mother’s
claim that state officials violated her constitutional rights by removing her children must be
evaluated distinctly from her husband’s claim when the state removed the children despite
evidence only implicating the husband in abuse of the children).
191. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming that a parent
abuses its child when a parent “creates or allows a ‘substantial risk’” of physical injury to the
child).
192. See Kisthardt, supra note 14, at 19-20 (describing social workers’ interpersonal and
counseling skills).
193. Id. at 20.
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case would not likely change the outcome. In applying this test, this
section will consider the preponderance of the evidence, serious risk
of harm, and lack of time determination in the context of the
Eldorado Raid.
1. Preponderance of the Evidence
To sustain a temporary removal under this test, Texas officials
would have been required to show that children were “more likely
than not” abused.194 The evidence the state could put forth included
a phone call,195 teenage mothers,196 and a “pervasive belief sys-
tem.”197 Unfortunately for state officials, neither the caller who left
the anonymous tip nor any evidence of her existence ever material-
ized.198 When officials arrived, they could not find anyone else to
break the FLDS “code of silence.” Thus officials were left with the
limited physical evidence of teenage pregnancies.199 Twenty of the
468 removed children became pregnant between the ages of thirteen
and seventeen.200 For the five teenage parents still classified as
minors, this evidence would have warranted their removal under a
preponderance of the evidence test. In traditional cases, state
statutes currently consider not only the child who has been abused,
but also siblings or others living in the home, when determining
whether to return a child to his or her parents.201 To child protective
194. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328-29 (2007) (explaining
the preponderance of the evidence test).
195. See supra text accompanying note 74.
196. See supra text accompanying note 77.
197. Id.
198. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 n.12 (Tex. App. May 22,
2008) (describing the problems with locating the alleged sixteen-year-old caller). Officials later
traced the call to a Colorado woman. See Ben Winslow, Swinton Enters Not Guilty Plea,
DESERT MORNING NEWS, July 10, 2008.
199. See Terri Langford & Lisa Sandberg, Many Teen Pregnancies in Sect, HOUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 29, 2008, at A1 (quoting state officials for the proposition that part of the reason for
removal was to attempt to break the “code of silence”).
200. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2.
201. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d) (Vernon 2008) (requiring: “In determining
whether there is a continuing danger to the physical health or safety of the child, the court
may consider whether the household to which the child would be returned includes a person
who:
(1) has abused or neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury
to or the death of the other child; or
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workers from the outside, sexual abuse perpetrated on the young
females of the FLDS community did not follow a predictable
pattern; young females were married (and expected to consummate
marriages) when elders in the community claimed to receive
revelations that the females were prepared to enter a “spiritual
marriage.”202 Thus, Department officials argued that the Eldorado
compound should be viewed as one household under the Texas
statute because of the difficulty in untangling the complicated
relationships behind the gates of the ranch to find the children who
interacted regularly with alleged perpetrators.203 If courts allowed
this analogy to stand, however, those living in intentional communi-
ties could face removal any time a registered sex offender moved
into the community. Though the secrecy and isolation of these
communities, along with the presence of offenders, raises suspicion,
it cannot warrant the drastic step of immediate removal without
knowledge of a child’s interaction with the offender. Twenty
pregnant teens out of a population of nearly 500 children (the
number of teenagers was not specified), while alarming, cannot
raise the inference that all of the children were likely abused.
Despite the difficulty of gathering evidence and intensely uncooper-
ative witnesses, Texas officials would have had to show some sort of
individualized finding under this standard that the children were
more likely than not abused. Department requested parents to
ensure that “children who lived in a home with a man who married
underage girls or agreed to an arranged marriage of an underage
daughter” to be kept away from that man.204 The court would have
found this evidence, if available despite the silence of witnesses,
sufficient to sustain removal of the pubescent girls fitting this
category under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The
individualized finding necessary to accompany the accusations of
institutionalized abuse would be satisfied by information that a man
living with the child had married underage females or allowed the
girls’ sisters to marry while underage.
(2) has sexually abused another child.”).
202. State Requests Foster Care for 8 FLDS Children, supra note 83 (quoting a young
female from the FLDS who stated “Heavenly Father is the one that tells [Jeffs] when a girl
is ready to get married and that he is only following the word of Heavenly Father").
203. In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.
204. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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A case from the Second Circuit provides Texas officials with a
possible alternative. The court in Nicholson v. Scoppetta held that
while evidence of a child’s mental state alone will not satisfy a
preponderance of the evidence standard for child removal, the “court
can use ‘competent opinion or expert testimony’ to make this
determination.”205 In the Texas Case, allowing competent expert
witnesses to interview children, especially pubescent teenage girls,
and examine them for evidence of Sexually Abused Child Syndrome
would have made compelling evidence for the removal of those
children. Even with the use of this evidence, the state would have
still failed to meet its burden for temporary removal for the vast
majority of the 468 children. The state would have met its burden
and sustained removal for: pregnant minors, minor mothers,
females living with men accused of perpetrating abuse or permitting
abuse of their daughters, and those diagnosed by competent expert
witnesses. Implementing a constitutional standard of this type
would reinforce that actual, not speculative, evidence is required
even for temporary removal. 
2. Risk of Serious Harm
Minor allegations of emotional or psychological harm should not
warrant removal of children in complex cases. Some questions
remain as to the precise definition of “serious harm.” However, the
definition rises above the level of instituting a “pervasive belief
system” and certainly includes “bruises or broken bones for which
there is no justifiable explanation.”206 Sexual abuse would also
qualify, as courts consider preventing sexual abuse a “major societal
and judicial concern.”207 In a recent dissent, three justices of the
Supreme Court cited a statistic that “40% of 7- to 13-year old sexual
assault victims are considered ‘seriously disturbed’” and concluded
that in child rape cases “[t]he harm that is caused to the victims and
to society at large by the worst child rapists is grave.”208 Evidence
205. 344 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003).
206. Arredondo v. Locklear, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (D.N.M. 2005).
207. Reilly, supra note 93, at 454.
208. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that
permitting states to execute child rapists does not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment found in the Eighth Amendment).
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provided by Department workers alleged that girls as young as
thirteen were abused in the Eldorado compound.209 State officials
would meet their burden of showing risk of serious harm under this
standard for those allegedly abused. For children included in the
removal who showed no evidence of abuse and were not in the
specially affected class of pubescent females, the risk that they could
later become victims or perpetrators when they come of age would
not qualify as a serious risk warranting removal. The population of
the ranch, larger than that of many small towns in the region,
cannot support the inference that all of its residents are engaged in
child abuse based on proof of abuse in less than twenty cases. 
3. No Time Element
Though the various federal courts have not employed a consis-
tent, precise standard to dispose of temporary cases, the decisions
have made findings of sufficient or insufficient time unnecessary in
temporary removal cases (complex or traditional).210 An abundance
of state legislation requires temporary removal merely be “sup-
ported by reasonable belief, probable cause, or the equivalent”;211
these legislatures prescribe no specific finding of insufficient time. 
Avoiding issues of precise timing would make complex cases much
easier to argue because in many instances abuse is institutionalized,
even preceded by religious ceremonies known as “spiritual mar-
riages,” but there is no predetermined date for the marriage and
subsequent sexual abuse of young girls.212 While some FLDS girls
may not have any thought or desire to marry, they could come home
at the age of twelve to hear their parents or a church elder telling
209. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-2 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008).
210. See Higgins-Shea, supra note 117, at 157-58 (stating that “[t]he majority of circuit
courts either reject or fail to address the time consideration factor discussed by both the
Tenenbaum and Mabe courts”). 
211. Id. at 148; see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5(d) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-106
(2008). But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-313(a)(1)(c) (2009) (stating that the child must be in
“immediate danger,” which means “removal is necessary to prevent serious harm”); N.Y.
FAMILY COURT ACT § 1024(a) (Consol. 1999) (requiring “not time enough to apply for an order”
before emergency approval will be upheld).
212. See State Requests Foster Care for 8 FLDS Children, supra note 83.
1234 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1197
them that a “revelation” has told the church leader that the girl’s
time to marry has come.213
Therefore, requiring child protective workers to make a showing
of insufficient time in order to sustain removal of children from
intentional communities would lead to highly speculative conjecture
about the possible date of a pubescent girl’s “spiritual” marriage.
Applying the standard without an element of timing still leads to
fair constitutional results that heavily weigh the interests of the
parent as well as the state’s parens patriae interest.
Under the proposed preponderance of the evidence standard, the
Texas Supreme Court would have made a different ruling, removing
females that evidence suggested were in danger. Yet, the standard
would still protect parents’ interests by not allowing states to
consider a community of children together and remove them all
based on suspicions or projections of future harm.
CONCLUSION
Courts must evaluate complex cases of child removal distinctly
from traditional cases and clearly establish a functional due process
standard for this evaluation. By choosing to live in isolation from
society and associate closely with child abusers, these parents
present additional factors which courts must weigh to vindicate
sufficiently the state’s parens patriae interest. If identical standards
are applied in traditional and complex cases, the state will not be
able to protect sufficiently children facing unique risks as they grow
up confined with predators. The best standard for courts to adopt in
these cases would require state workers to show “by a preponder-
ance of the evidence” that children are in danger of becoming
victims to the common practices of their intentional communities.
Such a standard will provide consistency and a proper balance of the
state’s and parents’ constitutional interests. However, this standard
will not lead to improper or overzealous removal without sufficient
evidence or when no serious harm is alleged. 
Even if such a standard was in place in Texas at the time or
Texas courts had adopted a similar one, admissible evidence would
213. Id.
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have warranted only the removal of a portion of the children in the
Eldorado compound. After extensive investigation, later reports led
the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services officials to
conclude that 275 of the children removed qualified as abused or
neglected.214 Only twelve of those were females subjected to sexual
abuse, and the Department labeled the remaining 263 children
“neglected,” without explaining in its report what the diagnosis
meant.215 The Department has not pursued further removal for any
of those diagnosed as “neglected,” electing instead to educate
parents on proper nurture of their children.216 If Texas had in place
the proper standard for temporary removal in complex cases, the
state officials would have likely followed more conservative
procedures from the beginning. Only removing those who met the
standard would have saved state funds, prevented potential
emotional and psychological damage to children, and saved an
abundance of court time and resources.
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